Elon Musk's X challenges Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, arguing its misuse for arbitrary content blocking without safeguards. Unlike Section 69A, which ensures transparency and judicial review, 79(3)(b) lacks accountability. The Supreme Court’s Shreya Singhal ruling limits its application, reinforcing X’s stance against government overreach.
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Elon Musk-owned X (formerly Twitter) has challenged the Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act (IT Act) 2000.
The Information Technology (IT) Act 2000 establishes legal frameworks for intermediaries—like social media platforms—to operate while protecting free speech and regulating harmful content.
Social media companies depend on provisions like Section 79, which acts as a "safe harbor," exempting them from liability for third-party user-generated content unless they fail to act upon government orders or court directives.
Recent government actions under Section 79(3)(b) have sparked controversy because they bypass stricter safeguards meant for content moderation.
It allows the government to hold intermediaries liable if they don’t remove unlawful content after receiving “actual knowledge” or notifications about such content.
The Supreme Court clarified in Shreya Singhal v/s Union of India (2015) case that this provision applies only when backed by a court order or government notifications tied to Article 19(2) grounds.
However, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) has started issuing blocking orders directly under Section 79(3)(b). In October 2023, MeitY instructed ministries, state governments, and police forces to issue blocking orders through this section. Then, in October 2024, MeitY launched the “Sahyog” portal to promote these orders. This approach skips procedural safeguards under the Act.
Section 69A provides a structured process for blocking content. It allows the government to block information considered necessary but requires strict compliance to constitutional principles outlined in Article 19(2). These include national security, public order, decency, morality, etc, and authorities must record reasons for blocking content, making their decisions transparent and open to judicial review.
Section 79(3)(b) focuses on intermediary liability rather than content regulation. By misusing this provision, the government bypasses recording reasons or following due process, which undermine accountability.
X argues that the government is misusing Section 79(3)(b) to create an unlawful content-blocking command without proper safeguards.
In its petition, X claims that government actions attempt to bypass the strict procedures mandated by Section 69A. For example, Section 69A ensures transparency and judicial supervision, whereas Section 79(3)(b) lacks these checks.
X also highlights that Section 79 was designed to shield intermediaries from liability for third-party content—not to empower the government to block content arbitrarily. Using Section 79(3)(b) violates both the intent of the law and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shreya Singhal .
It challenged Section 66A of the IT Act, which allowed vague offenses like causing “annoyance” or “inconvenience.” The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A as unconstitutional because it gave the government unchecked powers to restrict free speech.
The court upheld Section 69A, but clarified that intermediary liability under Section 79(3)(b) would apply only when supported by court orders or specific government notifications aligned with Article 19(2).
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