Context:

• The long-lingering power struggle in Naypyitaw has finally ended, and the Myanmar junta, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, has won the struggle, dashing decade-long hopes for a truly democratic Myanmar.
• The future of Myanmar’s democracy is uncertain, but the country, sandwiched between two powerful states competing for power and influence, is certain to be a key piece in the region’s geopolitics.
• New Delhi would need to be nimble-footed and creative in its responses with well-thought-out strategic choices taking precedence over knee-jerk reactions.

 

Coup, politics and geopolitics:

 

• If Myanmar’s democracy prior to the February 2021 coup was inadequate and intolerant towards minorities, its political future will be a lot more complicated, making the choices of outside powers far more constrained.
• Strong reactions and the threat of sanctions from the United States and the West in the wake of the recent coup could lead to unique political realignments in Myanmar.
• Even though the democratic credentials of the former State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, remain deeply diminished today, the international community may not have any alternatives when it comes to pursuing the restoration of democracy in the country.
• To rebuild the charisma of the fallen messiah, those batting for Suu Kyi in the international community may have to condone her government’s past actions against the Rohingya in order to highlight her suitability to be the saviour of democracy in Myanmar once again.

 

The China factor:

 

• This is a coup that seems to suit no one except the Tatmadaw, the armed forces of Myanmar.
• In the short run, the coup stands to hurt the interests of China, India and even the rest of the international community.
• However, the international community’s sharp reactions will likely force the Tatmadaw to turn to China.
• Even though international sanctions are unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s largely inward-looking junta and its Generals with little external interests, it would still expect Beijing to give them political and diplomatic support both within the region and globally.
• For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar, at least for the time being. Beijing has recently been cultivating Ms. Suu Kyi, who was keen on a strong relationship with China given the growing criticism she was facing from the West.
• On the positive side for Beijing, decisive western sanctions will force the military to get closer to China.
• China, therefore, has every reason to go easy on the junta and offer them support in return for increasing the Chinese footprint in the country.

 

New Delhi’s quandary:

 

• New Delhi faces the most challenging dilemma on how to respond to the military coup in Myanmar.
• The dual power centres of the military and the civilian government that existed in Naypyitaw until recently, suited New Delhi quite well as it did not have to worry about hurting the international community’s normative concerns or sacrificing its national interests while engaging them both.
• The February coup has undone that comfortable space New Delhi’s Myanmar policy occupied for close to a decade. While India’s national interests, under the new circumstances, would clearly lie in dealing with whoever is in power in Myanmar, India would find it difficult to openly support the junta given the strong western and American stance.
• On the other hand, it can ill-afford to offend the junta by actively seeking a restoration of democracy Being a close neighbour with clear strategic interests in Myanmar, offending the junta would be counter-productive.
• While Ms. Suu Kyi was getting cozy with Beijing, it was the Myanmar military that had been more circumspect, to Delhi’s delight of course. With Ms. Suu Kyi in detention, Beijing will focus its energies on wooing the Generals.

 

Cooperation, Rohingya issue:

 

• While a friendless Myanmar junta getting closer to China is a real worry for New Delhi, there are other concerns too.
• For one, Myanmar’s military played a helpful role in helping New Delhi contain the north-eastern insurgencies by allowing Indian military to pursue insurgents across the border into Myanmar.
• Coordinated action and intelligence sharing between the two forces have in the recent past been instrumental in beating back the insurgent groups in the northeast.
• Equally important is the issue of providing succour to the Rohingya in the wake of the military coup in Myanmar. Unless the military decides to engage in a peace process to gain some brownie points for itself, the Rohingya question is likely to be pushed aside with the campaign against them continuing relentlessly, perhaps with even more ferocity.
• The inability of the states in the region to address the legitimate concerns of the Rohingya or increased violations of their rights could potentially lead to a rise of extremism within the community, which in the longer run would not be in India’s interests.

 

Conclusion:

New Delhi then is left with very few clear policy options. It must continue to maintain relations with the government in power in Myanmar while discreetly pushing for political reconciliation in the country. In the meantime, the focus must be on improving trade, connectivity, and security links between the two sides.

 

https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/the-long-and-the-short-of-indias-naypyitaw-dilemma/article33787084.ece